Georgetown University Law Center

Scholarship @ GEORGETOWN LAW

2000

Taking Myths Seriously: An Essay For Lawyers
Donald C. Langevoort
Georgetown University Law Center, langevdc@law.georgetown.edu

This paper can be downloaded free of charge from:
https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/145

74 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1569-1597 (2000)
This open-access article is brought to you by the Georgetown Law Library. Posted with permission of the author.
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub
Part of the Law and Psychology Commons, and the Law and Society Commons

GEORGETOWN LAW
Faculty Publications

January 2010

Taking Myths Seriously:
An Essay For Lawyers

74 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1569-1597 (2000)

Donald C. Langevoort
Professor of Law
Georgetown University Law Center
langevdc@law.georgetown.edu
This paper can be downloaded without charge from:
Scholarly Commons: http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/145/
Posted with permission of the author

TAKING MYTHS SERIOUSLY: AN ESSAY FOR LAWYERS
DONALD C. LANGEVOORT*

INTRODUCTION

Consider the following claim: Much of what people believe is
based on insufficient empirical observation, and thus often inaccurate.
Yet their level of confidence in those beliefs is not adjusted
downward enough to reflect the risk of inaccuracy. In other words,
many beliefs relating to the state of the world are confidently held
illusions or-in a sufficiently dramatic setting-myths.1
This idea is hardly original; indeed, it is a stock insight of
contemporary social thought. Still, I want to pursue the idea more
deeply here, largely because lawyers do not really take it very
seriously. To be sure, legal authors endlessly challenge other people's
"myths" and "illusions." But the words are used mainly as a form of
name-calling, to connote naivete or foolishness on the part of the
believers or disingenuousness by those who propagate the belief. To
these writers, myth means no more than popular misconception, and
this fails to do justice to what is a much richer, and more complicated
idea.
Because understanding human inference and judgment is a
fundamental research agenda in all the social sciences, the scholarly
literature dealing with them is vast. Cognitive psychologists study it
at the level of individual brain function and processing. In turn,
because cognition and inference are social acts, they are also studied
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. Thanks to Mitt Regan, Vicki
Jackson, David Luban, Brian Bix, Richard Painter, Heidi Li Feldman and participants at the
faculty workshops at the University of Kentucky, Villanova and Vanderbilt.
1. Some definitional points: First, I am using the term "belief' here loosely, to mean some
mental representation of the state of the world in which the holder is confident. This is not the
same as certainty; one can believe something even while conceding that it might not be true. It
is the confidence that is important, and I suspect (for reasons that should become clear) that the
appropriate level of confidence is something measured viscerally, not in terms of probabilities.
My use of the term "myth" is fairly synonymous-it is something, usually of high cultural or
personal significance, that is strongly believed in the face of limited knowledge. Consistent with
the views of most scholars of myth, I do not want to equate myth with falsity. See, e.g., WENDY
DONIGER, THE IMPLIED SPIDER: POLmCS AND THEOLOGY IN MYTH 4 (1998).
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by social psychologists under the heading of "social cognition."
Social cognition then blends into mainstream sociology in the form of
"social constructionism" in the Berger and Luckmann genre? and
from there into almost all of postmodernism. 3 Like most everyone, I
must confess readily to having read only a tiny fraction of the
cognitive research in all these various disciplines, which for all its bulk
is still fairly tentative, far from any convincingly documented grand
theory of human nature. All I have done is to learn enough to be
intrigued both by the individual claims and some of the thematic
connections.
The specific idea I want to explore has to do with the
motivational power of myths and illusions on a personal level. To
take a mundane example, people are often told to "believe in
themselves." The underlying idea seems to be that high selfconfidence is an important motivator, especially in competitive
settings like school, sports, business and the professions. This is not
the idle talk of family and friends; millions of dollars are spent each
year by people and their employers on motivational books and
programs that offer endless variations on this simple theme in an
effort to bolster the self-confidence of the audience. Yet the idea is
intellectually vacant, except to the very limited extent that it is meant
to correct a given person's erroneous belief that he or she lacks the
skill to compete when in fact that skill is present. There are plenty of
reasons why one may not meet high expectations, no matter how hard
one believes or tries, and, rationally, there is never reason to ignore
or downplay the realistic risk of failure. Is it possible, however, that
there is something more to motivation, so that the myopic act of
"believing in oneself" actually can payoff on average even if it is
induced largely through some form of psychological cheerleading?
Are there unrealistic beliefs in things besides oneself for which there
are similar motivational payoffs? And importantly, is there a pricepersonal or social-paid as a result? What follows offers some
2. See PETER BERGER & THOMAS LUCKMANN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCI10N OF
REALITY: A TREATISE IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE (1966). For an interesting review
of more recent work, see Paul DiMaggio, Culture and Cognition, 23 ANN. REV. SOC. 263 (1997).
3. It also enters into nearly every other discipline within the social sciences.
Notwithstanding economics' historic commitment to the observation of outcomes rather than
decision-processes, the cognitive dimension of research into economic behavior is becoming
increasingly prominent there, too. See, e.g., Matthew Rabin, Psychology and Economics, 36 J.
ECON. LITERATURE 11 (1998). Contemporary research in organization theory is also heavily
directed toward the study of how large groups perceive their environments and act in response
to these perceptions. See, e.g., James P. Walsh, Managerial and Organizational Cognition: Notes
from a Trip Down Memory Lane, 6 ORG. SCI. 280 (1995).
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tentative answers that relate to law and lawyering.
I.

MYTHS AND ILLUSIONS AS ANXIETY BUFFERS

To me, the most compelling theme in social cognition is this:
Most social settings of interest and importance are characterized by a
high degree of ambiguity. That ambiguity is highly stressful,
especially in settings with a heavy goal-orientation in which
significant decisions about the future have to be made. To reduce the
anxiety, people unconsciously impose an order on their environment,
a set of causal explanations that lead to an artificial, but more
comfortable sense of predictability.
As individuals, groups,
organizations and cultures, people come to have greater confidence in
their construals than is warranted empirically. And because of the
continuing ambiguity in the feedback from the environment, this
artificial confidence is often not subject to disconfirmation, and thus
persists.
Again, this is nothing new. Social theory has long associated
cultural mythmaking with the need to impose order and confidence in
the face of mystery and chaos. To hope to make a contribution, then,
I will move to the more local level, to explore group and personal
"anxiety buffers" in micro-settings of special interest and importance
to lawyers. Although there are doctrinal implications one can draw
from this-and a part of what follows will make suggestions relating
to the field of professional responsibility and the seemingly quixotic
effort to make lawyers more virtuous-it is the ex ante use of this
learning on which I will mainly concentrate. At their best, lawyers
are problem-solvers.4 They help their clients through unfamiliar and
stressful situations, finding answers and solutions (most often through
negotiation with others) that are satisfying enough to allow clients to
turn their attention toward other matters.
They help clients
"satisfice," to use Herbert Simon's term, in a world of bounded
rationality. The main value within law to understanding inference
and decision-making better, then, is simply that lawyers are involved
in so much difficult inference and decision-making in their own
professional lives and the lives of their clients.

4. See, e.g., Paul Brest, The Responsibility of Law Schools: Educating Lawyers as
Counselors and Problem Solvers, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5 (1995); Carrie MenkelMeadow, Taking Problem-Solving Pedagogy Seriously: A Response to the Attorney General, 49
J. LEGAL Eouc. 14 (1999).
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Individual Sense-Making

Even within psychology, the processes by which people make
sense of their environments is the subject of study from a set of often
inconsistent research agendas. For many, the organizing metaphor is
the human mind as a computer-like information processor. Within
this genre, some researchers probe for evidence of consistent
rationality. Others-the recently celebrated "heuristics and biases"
branch of the study of judgment and decision-making5 -100k for
mental models that are prone to predictable error, even if they are
useful and adaptive much of the time. Still others use different
images. Social cognition may be described, for example, by invoking
the image of people as "intuitive politicians,"6 or even "intuitive
lawyers. "7
Whatever the preferred metaphor, the majority of psychologists
see the process of sense-making as a highly creative task. That is to
say, the amount of data available to the individual in most situations
. is far short of that necessary for inference that meets anything
resembling well-grounded empiricism, and the mind lacks the
capacity to process all of that which is available. Hence, through a
variety of shortcuts, the mind fills in the gaps. That much is not very
controversial. The divisive question is what drives the gap-filling.
Some psychologists contend that all that drives it are the very
demands of simplification. There is a large literature that locates
heuristic processes simply within the framework of limited data and
limited processing capacity: these are cold, cognitive traits that are no
more than the best available methods of sense-making.8 But I find
myself drawn to the research that treats people as strongly needing to
make sense of things, so that the creative gap-filling is driven by the
demand for greater certainty than nature will otherwise allow. Such
certainty, illusory or not, is an antidote to stress and anxiety.
5. This literature has become very popular among legal academics. See e.g., Robert C.
Ellickson, Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to Rational Actors: A Critique of Classical Law
and Economics, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 23 (1989); Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis of Law,
64 U. Cm. L. REv. 1175 (1997). For a survey, see Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Theories
of Judgment and Decision Making in Legal Scholarship: A Literature Review, 51 VAND. L. REV.
1499 (1998).
6. See, e.g., Philip E. Tetlock, An Alternative Metaphor in the Study of Judgment and
Choice: People as Politicians, 1 THEORY & PSYCHOL. 451 (1991).
7. See, e.g., Roy F. Baumeister & Leonard S. Newman, Self-Regulation of Cognitive
Inference and Decision Processes, 20 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 3 (1994).
8. See RICHARD NISBETI & LEE Ross, HVMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND
SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT 228-34 (1980).

HeinOnline -- 74 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1572 1998-2000

2000]

TAKING MYTHS SERIOUSLY: AN ESSAY FOR LAWYERS

1573

Many of the well-known "heuristics and biases" fit nicely into
such a motivational story. The tendency of people to find illusory
correlations, and see trends where there really is no causation, is a
good example. So is the hindsight bias, the tendency to overestimate
the likelihood that one could have foreseen some future event once
one is told that the event actually occurred.9 The fundamental
attribution bias says that people overestimate their ability to predict
how another will act based on their knowledge of that person's
character and disposition, underestimating the influence of situational
factors. Each of these supports a feeling of control through an
illusory ability to predict more about the future than one really can.
What all these heuristics involve is a guess-on average, a good
one. And it would be hard to make much of a motivational claim if
people tended to recognize their inferences - and the process of
sense-making-as the guesswork that it is. But another robust finding
in the literature is that people develop higher levels of confidence in
the accuracy of their inferences than is warranted. This is the famous
"overconfidence effect,"10 observed especially among American
males. Asked to estimate their confidence in the accuracy of their
judgments, people (including many experts)11 usually estimate too
high. While this, too, might be purely cognitive, I find irresistible the
inference that the overconfidence is evolutionarily adaptive.
The evolutionary story, which can be told in terms of either
economics12 or biology,n is simple. Doubt and uncertainty are
paralyzing. By contrast, the strong belief that one understands what
is going on leads to more confident predictions, and hence action.
Confidence is associated with initiative and persistence. What's
9. For a legal audience, see Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of
Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L. REv. 571 (1998).
10. See MAx H. BAZERMAN, JUDGMENT IN MANAGERIAL DECISION MAKING 37-39, 46
(3d ed. 1994).
11. See Colin Camerer & Dan Lovallo, Overconfidence and Excess Entry: An Experimental
Approach, 89 AM. ECON. REv. 306 (1999). In recent years, there has been a steady increase in
the willingness of mainstream finance theorists to claim that overconfidence is an important
factor in explaining stock price behavior. See, e.g., Kent Daniel et aI., Investor Psychology and
Security Market Under-and Overreactions, 53 J. FIN. 1839 (1998).
12. That is, seeing what traits will give their holder the best "survivorship" capacity within
specific cultural or institutional settings. See generally Richard R. Nelson, Recent Evolutionary
Theorizing About Economic Change, 33 J. ECON. LITERATURE 48 (1995).
13. In the sociobiology literature, confidence and optimism are closely related, and both
are viewed as genetically favored. For the seminal study, see generally LIONEL DGER,
OPTIMISM: THE BIOLOGY OF HOPE (1979). For an approach combining biology and economics,
see generally Michael Waldman, Systematic Errors and the Theory of Natural Selection, 84 AM.
ECON. REv. 482 (1994).
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more, it has a wonderful capacity to become a self-fulfilling prophecy.
Not only will better events, on average, occur to those who show
initiative and persistence, the reaction of others to displays of
confidence often leads others to defer and let the confident person
leadY There is a story told by Albert Szent-Gyorti that captures this
perfectly.15 A platoon of soldiers during World War II was lost in the
Alps. Overcome with fear and despair, they did little until an officer
found a map. Then they rallied, worked and finally found their way
to safety. Only later did they learn that the map was of the Pyrenees,
not the Alps.
Among other things, this story helps show why illusory
confidence will often not be learned away by trial and error.
Overconfidence will be eroded by negative feedback that is
immediate and unambiguous. Weather forecasters, for example,
learn to calibrate probabilities fairly well because they are engaged in
repeat tasks with prompt feedback. In contrast, most of us operate in
environments where the consequences of our actions rarely become
evident immediately. If and when they do, there are multiple possible
causes and explanations. In the face of ambiguity, illusions can
persist if we are motivated enough to want to sustain them. It is often
observed that high-ranking business executives can operate for long
periods of time in settings with sufficiently fuzzy and delayed
feedback from their choices and hence have ample room to maintain
their personal and group myths. 16 So, I suspect, do lawyers and their
clients.
So far, I have suggested that people often deyelop excess
confidence in their explanations of situations and events. Their
"schemas" and beliefs are stronger than they should be because
confidence is energizing, lack of confidence debilitating. But this says
nothing about the likely content of sense-making strategies. Here we
can make a simple and intuitive leap. If strong inferences and beliefs
are adaptive because they are stress-reducing and confidencebuilding, then the kinds of illusory inferences that are most likely to
develop and persist are those that best play a similar motivational
14. On the influence of confidence within groups, see generally Paul Zamoth & Janet A.
Sniezek, The Social Influence of Confidence in Group Decision Making, 33 J. EXPERIMENTAL
SOc. PSYCHOL. 345 (1997).
15. It is related in KARL E. WEICK, SENSEMAKING IN ORGANIZATIONS 54 (1995).
16. In this sphere, the work of James G. March is particularly prominent. See, e.g., JAMES
G. MARCH, DECISIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS (1988); Barbara Levitt & James .G. March,
Organizational Learning, 14 ANN. REv. SOc. 319 (1988); James G. March & Zur Shapira,
Managerial Perspectives on Risk and Risk Taking, 33 MGMT. SCI. 1404 (1987).
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role.
By far the favorite adaptive form of inference in the
psychological literature is egotistical inferenceP There is a strong
self-serving bias to people's judgments and decisions. People need to
see themselves as good and reasonable, and subconsciously distort
evidence ("rationalize") with impunity to bolster or maintain a
positive self-image. Because it goes to one's fundamental sense of
identity, this is one kind of personal bias that I think properly
deserves the word "myth." One tells stories to oneself that inflate
feelings of efficacy and control, establishing a sense of identity less
susceptible to the threats of the everyday world. That is why egos are
so prickly, people so averse to criticism. The illusion of self-efficacy
that people build in their lives is a buffer against anxiety; ego-threats
attack that buffer and hence threaten to increase stress. Indeed, there
is one strand of research in social psychology that sees self-esteem
specifically as a "terror management" device. ls High self-esteem, the
proponents argue, leads to the feeling that one has an important
influence and place in society. It even reduces the fear of death by
allowing individuals to see themselves as part of something enduring.
The psychological literature offers other possible anxiety buffers
as well. Another strong one, I suspect, is the illusion of normalcy.
For a variety of reasons, people are inclined to interpret new data as
consistent with their prevailing perceptions, not as requiring revision.
Change is distracting and stressful. The first subtle signals of change,
including those that suggest danger (what lawyers like to call "red
flags"), are often ignored. 19
Another intriguing body of research comes under the heading of
17. The classic account here is found in Anthony G. Greenwald, The Totalitarian Ego:
Fabrication and Revision of Personal History, 35 AM. PSYCHOL. 603 (1980). I explored this
phenomenon explicitly in Donald C. Langevoort, Ego, Human Behavior, and Law, 81 VA. L.
REv. 853 (1995). As with overconfidence, there may be significant gender and cultural effects
here: the illusion of self-efficacy is more pronounced in males, and observed less strongly in
other cultures. However, we should be careful not to generalize too strongly here. See id. at 860
n.25.
18. See, e.g., Jeff Greenberg et aI., Why Do People Need Self-Esteem?: Converging
Evidence that Self-Esteem Serves an Anxiety Buffering Function, 63 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 913 (1992); Sheldon Solomon et aI., A Terror Management Theory of Social Behavior:
The Psychological Functions of Self-Esteem and Cultural Worldviews, 24 ADVANCES
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 93 (1991). Their work relates to the cultural theories made
popular by Ernest Becker. See, e.g., ERNEST BECKER, THE BIRTH AND DEATH OF MEANING
(1962).
19. Of interest to lawyers should be an account of the illusion of normalcy during the time
leading up to the recall of the Ford Pinto after warning signs appeared regarding its fuel tank
safety. See, e.g., Dennis A. Gioia, Pinto Fires and Personal Ethics: A Script Analysis of Missed
Opponunities, 11 J. Bus. ETHICS 379 (1992).
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"just world" thinking. 20 There is a documented tendency among a
significant segment of the population to consider the world relatively
"just" in terms of causes and consequences. On average-I doubt
that many people would say always-good things happen to good
people, bad things to bad. The obvious consequence is to judge a
tragic situation by blaming the victim. This is a commonly observed
phenomenon, for example, in rape cases. The standard explanation
for the prevalence of this kind of thinking is specifically stress-related:
such a belief, coupled with an egotistical self-concept, reduces the fear
that bad things will happen to oneself.
A further possibility that I find particularly interesting-and
quite important legally-has to do with trust and reliance. A
common observation is that many people trust others, especially
authority figures, to a greater extent than prudence would warrant.
There is a good chance, then, that trust is motivated. One reason
(among many, admittedly) has to do with the desire to displace the
anxiety and potential for regret associated with an important decision
by shifting both responsibility and potential blame to another.
Patients' faith in their doctors is a common illustration. I have
suggested elsewhere that stockbrokers and investment advisers playa
similar role, with an obvious temptation for the manipulation of
trust. 21 Here we have an interesting confluence with the egotistic
bias-those with the most self-confidence will be able to induce the
most trusting behavior by others. There is also a comparable
explanation for conformity: again, reducing anxiety by choosing to
follow the lead of others, with the associated confidence-building
cognition that they must know what they are doing.
I could go on, but I suspect that I have made the point. People's
sense-making strategies are often driven by a desire to see their world
as more understandable, predictable and controllable than it really is.
This does not mean that inferences become utterly unrealistic. There
are strong limits to how much reality can be distorted by people who
must function within social, institutional and marketplace constraints.
But in ambiguous settings where one's mind is free to engage in the
20. See, e.g., MELVIN J. LERNER, THE BELIEF IN A JUST WORLD (1981); KELLY G.
SHAVER,
THE
ATTRIBUTION
OF
BLAME:
CAUSALITY,
RESPONSIBILITY,
AND
BLAMEWORTHINESS 132-34 (1985); Alan Lambert et aI., Perceptions of Risk and the Buffering
Hypothesis: The Role of Just World Beliefs and Right Wing Authoritarianism, 25 PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 643 (1999).
21. See generally Donald C. Langevoort, Selling Hope, Selling Risk: Some Lessons for Law
from Behavioral Economics About Stockbrokers and Sophisticated Customers, 84 CAL. L. REv.
627 (1996).
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creative interpretation of events, illusions can be strong and
persistent.
If our adaptation story is right, they are not necessarily such bad
things, either-on average. Yet they do produce occasional bad,
sometimes even disastrous, judgments. Moreover, something left
unclear in the literature is whether the buffering function really just
represses the anxiety, so that the more work the mind has to do to
maintain the myth and fuel the confidence in the face of adverse
feedback, the greater the toll in terms of stress-related physical and
mental disorders. 22 At the very least, we should note a temporal
dimension here: over time, with more and more feedback, the ease
with which the mind can deflect negative attributions diminishes. So,
too, with success; as one gains power and responsibility, it becomes
harder to externalize blame. It would not be surprising, then, to find
among those who have achieved much a gradual progression toward
what Max Weber (with respect to cultural beliefs) called
"disenchantment." At some point, a person may finally see that the
successes that he had turned into an inspiring story about merit were
as much or more the product of luck. Whether this is simple
maturation or something more threatening is hard to say. Many
psychologists claim that society'S greatest realists are the moderately
depressed.23
B.

Group Myths and Illusions

Sense-making is largely a social act. The story of the lost military
patrol was really about group anxiety and group confidence, and a
large amount of research in social cognition speaks to the processes of
perception and inference among sets of individuals. The precise
relationship between individual cognitions and group processes is
highly contested among students of group and organizational
behavior. 24 Still, it is common to see claims that the same kinds of
heuristics, biases and other illusion-producing tendencies observed
among individuals can also be observed in groupS.25 In fact, in many
22. The incidence of stress related disorders among high achievers is often noted. For a
discussion of the pathologies of success, see generally CHARLES M. KELLY, THE DESTRUCTIVE
ACHIEVER: POWER AND ETHICS IN THE AMERICAN CORPORATION (1988).
23. See, e.g., SUSAN T. FISKE & SHELLY E. TAYLOR, SOCIAL COGNmON 214-15 (2d ed.
1991).
24. See, e.g., Barry M. Staw & Robert I. Sutton, Macro Organizational Psychology, in
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY IN ORGANIZATIONS 350 (J. Keith Murnighan ed., 1993).
25. See Norbert Kerr et ai., Bias in Judgment: Comparing Individuals and Groups, 103
PSYCH. REV. 687, 687 (1996).
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instances, group settings have been shown to exacerbate or intensify
these biases. Groups of individuals working together toward some
aim face a variety of challenges that require strongly heuristic forms
of behavior: they have to communicate information to each other,
identify the nature of their task, assess costs, benefits and potential
strategies, and arrive at some consensus for action. Groups will be
more effective to. the extent that there are common perceptions or
inferences not subject to time-consuming and stressful renegotiation.
Members risk exclusion if they introduce stressful dissonant
information into a group setting once the group has implicitly agreed
to think otherwise. This, in turn, leads to the suppression of
information and ideas and cognitive conformity above and beyond
what any individual acting alone might bring to the situation. Irving
Janis became famous for terming this process "groupthink," which he
and his colleagues explain explicitly as a stress reduction mechanism. 26
For example, the bias toward optimism and self-efficacy has been
shown to be even greater in groups than it is in individuals. 27 Groups
edit out negative information in order to maintain cohesion; the
information flow bias in favor of positive or reinforcing data
intensifies the feeling of power and control among members. While
this can, as Janis emphasizes, sometimes lead to poor decisionmaking, on balance the effect is quite positive. The stress reduction
leads to better focus, concentration and persistence. By increasing
confidence and sense of group efficacy, members are more likely to
trust each other, rather than engage in the kinds of selfish behavior
triggered by fear and anxiety. That, in turn, makes the group that
much more effective-another self-fulfilling prophecy that can readily
reinforce members' perceptions that they were right all along.
Sense-making accounts can be found in many other areas of
social behavior. As put in a classic study by Gordon Allport and Leo
Postman, rumors relieve "intellectual pressure" that arises because
"we want to know the why, how and wherefore of the world that
surrounds us... our minds protest against chaos."28 This sensemaking role has significant influence in organizational and market
settings, where uncertainty is commonplace, rumors rampant and
26. IRVING L. JANIS, GROUPTHINK 9 (1982). For a more comprehensive study, see
generally IRVING L. JANIS & LEON MANN, DECISION MAKING: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS
OF CONFLICf, CHOICE, AND COMMITMENT (1977).
27. See, e.g., Chip Heath & Forest J. Jourden, Illusion, Disillusion and the Buffering Effect
of Groups, 69 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 103 (1997).
28. GORDON W. ALLPORT & LEO POSTMAN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RUMOR 37 (1947).
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confidence crucia1.29
The role of myth is also prominent in the study of organizations.
In one of the seminal articles in the "new institutional" sociology of
organizations, John Meyer and Brian Rowan talk about myth and
ceremony as common responses to the ambiguity and anxiety that
firms face in settings where the right strategy is a matter of
institutional guesswork. 30 Among the common "myths" -just as in
classic cultural and religious myths-is the creation story: the account
of how the organization came to be in a way that gives it a special
sense of identity and purpose. Not surprisingly, the typical stories of
"unique" organizational identity, of what makes the organization
special and different, vary little from each other. 31 Yet they play
important roles as guides to behavior. In their study of institutional
investors, William O'Barr and John Conley argue that "founding
stories" account for significant variations in how the institutions make
investment decisions. 32
Just like individuals, organizations are conformists. They pursue
legitimacy in the eyes of key resource providers and hence take cues
as to right behavior from others who have achieved an apparent level
of success. The result is a "mimetic" process whereby common
beliefs and practices diffuse among organizations.33 While social
conformity can be explained without resort to any strong cognitive
element, sociology is increasingly willing to posit that people within
organizations come to adopt beliefs heavily influenced by the desire
to gain or preserve legitimacy. Because of this motivational
influence, these beliefs need not track reality all that closely: there
evolves only a "loose coupling" between organizational sense-making
and objective evidence. These illusions are functional insofar as they
motivate, protect against anxiety, and assist in creating group
cohesion.
29. See generally Nicholas DiFonzo et ai., Reining in Rumors, 23 ORG. DYNAMICS 47
(1994); Nicholas DiFonzo & Prashant Bordia, Rumor and Prediction: Making Sense (but Losing
Dollars) in the Stock Market, 71 ORG. BEHA v. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 329 (1997).
30. See generally John W. Meyer & Brian Rowan, Institutionalized Organizations: Formal
Structure as Myth and Ceremony, 83 AM. J. SOC. 340 (1977).
31. Job interviewees might take note that answers to the inevitable question "what makes
your firmJlaw school/company different?" lead to very similar answers among firms, law schools
and companies.
32. See generally WILLIAM O'BARR & JOHN M. CONLEY, FORTUNE AND FOLLY: THE
WEALTH AND POWER OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTING (1992).
33. See Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter w. Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional
Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields, 48 AM. SOC. REV. 147, 151
(1983).
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So far, the examples of social construction that we have
examined are fairly benign. But if there is such a thing as group
narcissism,34 identity and performance myths may become self-serving
in the same way that individual narcissism can blind people to the
harms that they do to others. There are many studies in the social
psychology of organizations of how in-group biases can lead to selfserving forms of inference. Of particular interest to lawyers, a
fascinating set of papers shows how various aspects of employment
and equal opportunity law have been construed by "human resource"
professionals (including lawyers) in a way that serves the self-interest
of those professionals. 35 While it would be easy to offer such an
account purely in political terms-deliberate rent-seeking-I suspect
that the professionals sincerely come to believe in their constructions,
something that makes them more committed, confident and
persuasive in the intensely political corporate world. One could tell a
similar story about lawyers' use of overprotective (and expensive)
boilerplates in contract negotiations36 and corporate lawyers'
commitment to the diffusion of anti takeover techniques like the
poison pill,37 which for whatever value they deliver to clients certainly
increases the wealth of the professionals who design and implement
them.
II. SOME IMPLICATIONS
My claim so far boils down to the idea that people are inclined to
make sense of their environment via creative interpretation, reducing
the anxiety of uncertainty by imposing artificial and illusory
coherence. Predictably, the explanations that are the most adaptive
as sense-making devices are the ones that prompt useful forms of
behavior (confidence, persistence, etc.) by operating as anxiety
buffers.

34. See generally Andrew D. Brown, Narcissism, Identity and Legitimacy, 22 ACAD. MGMT.
REv. 643 (1997); see also infra text accompanying notes 58-61.
35. See, e.g., Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Environments and Organizational Governance: The
Expansion of Due Process in the American Workplace, 95 AM. J. SOc. 1401, 1417 (1990); Lauren
B. Edelman et aI., Professional Construction of Law: The Inflated Threat of Wrongful Discharge,
26 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 47, 49 (1992).
36. See Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Path Dependence in Corporate Contracting:
Increasing Returns, Herd Behavior and Cognitive Biases, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 347,348 (1996). See
generally Donald C. Langevoort & Robert K. Rasmussen, Skewing the Results: The Role of
Lawyers in Transmitting Legal Rules, 5 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 375 (1997).
37. See Michael J. Powell, Professional Innovation: Corporate Lawyers and Private
Lawmaking, 18 LAW & SOc. INQUIRY 423, 423 (1993).
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This triggers three almost scripted reactions among lawyers. The
first is to point to the palpable prevalence of stress and anxiety in
modern life as reason to doubt that any "buffers" exist or, if they do,
work very welL That, however, misunderstands the nature of
buffering. The world is an extraordinarily stress-producing place,
often in ways too unambiguous to rationalize.
What these
psychological devices do is simply provide a mechanism for managing
stress, deflecting that which can be put aside so that the task of
dealing with what is left is more tractable. To use the story of the lost
platoon once again, no doubt even with the illusion of a map the
soldiers were anxious. The point is simply that without the map, the
stress was that much greater, crossing the line from manageable to
debilitating.
The second reaction is: "I knew that already. Tell me something
new." As 1 acknowledged at the outset, the common presence of
cultural myths, with their anxiety-reducing role, is a standard
intellectual insight. And most everyone has observed, in others at
least, the everyday presence of rationalization, denial, egotism and
other common tools of self-deception.
While many in the law-trained audience will thus say that they
know that such cognitive mechanisms exist, 1 strongly suspect that
most implicitly marginalize them. Biases, they say, are the stuff of
weak-mindedness, observable among the general population but not
among those who are smart and successful and acting in settings
where good decisions "count." Perhaps they help us understand
foolish consumer behavior (gambling and smoking, for example), but
in the Darwinian competition for survival in high-stakes games - the
games lawyers and their well-heeled clients play-they simply can't
be of much importance.
That perception is, of course, a psychologist's delight, for it is a
perfect example of an egocentric tendency much the subject of
classical myth - hubris. The striking insight from the sense-making
literature is that distortions of reality, especially things such as
overconfidence and over-optimism, are commonplace among skilled,
educated people. And, even more counterintuitively, some of their
success may actually be due to the presence of such myths and
illusions. Myth-making is stable in an evolutionary sense even among
the "fittest."
Still, lawyers tend to resist this, especially within their own world.
The in-group rhetoric of lawyering is extraordinarily rationalist, and
that discourse cannot be abandoned without doing substantial
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violence to the vanity embedded in the prevailing professional selfimage. This, in turn, spills over into perceptions of and relationships
with the larger world. Psychologists have identified a strong human
tendency, termed the "false consensus effect," to overestimate the
extent to which others share one's own attitudes, beliefs and
inferences. 38 Interpersonal communication often fails because the
speaker wrongly assumes a coincidence of beliefs and perceptions,
and hence fails to do the work needed to understand, connect and
persuade. 39 As we shall see later on, lawyers who project too much of
their own myth of rationality onto others run the risk of failing to
understand them, compromising their ability to advise or negotiate
effectively.
The third predictable reaction is: "So what? Give me something
normative." Depending on whose sense-making strategies we want to
consider, there are many possible responses. The legal literature has
begun to address some of these: a good example would be the recent
coupling of articles by Jon Hanson and Douglas Kysar. They explore
smokers' myths and the ability of tobacco companies to manipulate
and extend them. Then, they offer a clear normative response:
continued, if not greater, emphasis on enterprise liability.40 Along
very different lines, any significant look at the behavior of juries
would want to consider their sense-making strategies: how jurors
create mental "stories" as they confront evidence offered at trial,
stories that produce coherence, but not necessarily accuracy.
Psychologists Reid Hastie and Nancy Pennington have developed a
celebrated and very helpful research program built around the "story
model" of jury cognition.41
But I suspect that most of these still indulge the hubris previously
observed, concentrating on the non-elite strata of society to find
illustrations of illusory thinking for which to develop appropriate
38. See Gary Marks & Nonnan Miller, Ten Years of Research on the False-Consensus
Effect: An Empirical and Theoretical Review, 102 PSYCHOL. BULL. 72, 72 (1987).
39. See Dale W. Griffin & Lee Ross, Subjective Construal, Social Inference and Human
Misunderstanding, 24 ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 319, 337-45 (1991).
40. See Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some
Evidence of Market Manipulation, 112 HARV. L. REv. 1420, 1468 (1999); Jon D. Hanson &
Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of Market Manipulation, 74
N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 707-09, 732-33 (1999). Some of my work in corporate and securities law
extends similar insights about myths and illusions, with nonnative recommendations. See, e.g.,
Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why Corporations Mislead
Stock Market Investors (and Cause Other Social Harms), 146 U. PA. L. REv. 101, 108, 171-72
(1997).

41. See Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, A Cognitive Theory of Juror Decision Making:
The Story Model, 13 CARDOZO L. REv. 519, 520-21, 538 (1991).
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legal responses. What I would suggest here is that lawyers look more
closely at their own worlds for anxiety buffers and other forms of
myth-thinking. With respect to my interests, that takes us to the
world of corporate executives and corporate lawyers.
A.

The Entrepreneurial Mind

The most obvious connection between law and the kind of stressdeflecting cognitive distortions that we have identified has to do with
risk-taking. At the risk of some oversimplification, the cognitive
distortions we observe among successful segments of the population
are those that create a heightened sense of confidence and control
over the immediate environment. For all its positive pay-offs, this
may blunt the perception of risk, leading to choices that sometimes
cause harm. Buffered anxiety is not likely to produce prudence,
especially when evaluated in hindsight.
While it is again tempting to pursue this normatively (it says
much of use to tort law, I suspect), I am more intrigued by how a
business lawyer, who by intuition or training is adept at identifying
these kinds of myths among clients and adversaries, might use that
skill. The obvious temptation would be to exploit them. In fact, one
can look at the so-called "art" of sales and marketing as just that-the
skill at finding and feeding other people's illusions and getting their
money before reality sets in.42 The sale of a business at a high price is
easier if the prospective buyers' fantasies of competence, wealth and
status are well-primed. The strong subconscious desire to trust in a
business relationship can also be exploited by donning the external
trappings of trustworthiness. Whether it is ethical to do these sorts of
thing is an obvious and important question, though not one that raises
any conceptually different issues from those in the well-played-out
debate over gamesmanship and candor in negotiations generally.43
Because there will usually be lawyers on the other side, such
manipUlativeness might be checked even when the opposing client is
otherwise susceptible to influence. Of course, the Machiavellian
lawyer could simply tum his art to opposing counsel, seeking to take
advantage of the opponent's ego or desire for status to drive a wedge
42 See generally ROBERT B. ClALDINI, INFLUENCE: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PERSUASION
(1996).

43. See, e.g., Gerald B. Wetlaufer, The Ethics of Lying in Negotiations, 75 IOWA L. REV.
1219, 1220-21 (1990); James J. White, Machiavelli and the Bar: Ethical Limitations on Lying in
Negotiation, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 926, 929-31.
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between the lawyer and his or her client's interests. I suspect that
that happens more than we would like to admit. As is often made
plain by those who teach negotiation skills to lawyers with a heavy
dosage of psychology, the most important use of this training is
defensive: learning how not to be taken advantage of in this fashion,
by learning to recognize your own capacity to rationalize
concessions.44
Serious discussion of influence activities by lawyers tends to stop
with tactics directed toward the opposing side. But stopping here
would be a serious mistake because it misses a more dimly
illuminated aspect of sophisticated legal practice. At this point, I
think, the relevance of mythic sense-making should shift to the
negotiation of reality that occurs between lawyers and clients.
Imagine, for example, that a lawyer believes that her client, say a
start-up entrepreneur seeking external financing, has an
unrealistically optimistic sense of the prospects for his business. This
is hardly a far-fetched example, for start-up entrepreneurs are a wellstudied breed, prone toward greater over-optimism and illusions of
control than the general population.45 It is especially apt if we situate
this client in Silicon Valley, perhaps the most fertile soil for the
creation of contemporary American myths. A natural response, with
a long pedigree in the literature on the lawyer as the "dispassionate
counselor," is for the lawyer to undertake the task of turning the
client into a realist and emphasize the need to bargain hard for
"downside" risk protection. There are ample and sobering statistics,
for example, on start-up fatalities. Indeed, lawyers do seem to relish
throwing cold water on other people's hopes and dreams, which
happens to be a good way of establishing their own superior
sophistication and experience.46 But I suspect that most successful
44. Robert Cialdini notes explicitly that his effort in writing about the psychology of
influence was to enable people to resist influence tactics, but that the greatest interest in the
book is on the part of those who wish to learn to manipulate others more effectively. Robert B.
Cialdini, Social Influence and the Triple Tumor Structure of Organizational Dishonesty, in
CODES OF CONDUCf: BERAVIORAL RESEARCH INTO BUSINESS ETHICS 44, 44 (David M.
Messick & Ann E. TenbrunseI eds., 1996).
45. See, e.g., Lowell W. Busenitz & Jay B. Barney, Differences Between Entrepreneurs and
Managers in Large Organizations: Biases and Heuristics in Strategic Decision-Making, 12 J. Bus.
VENTURING 9, 15 (1997). A recent best-selling book about Silicon VaHey entrepreneurs is filled
with examples of very strong optimistic illusions. See generally Po BRONSON, THE NUDIST ON
THE LATE SHIFT AND OTHER TRUE TALES OF SILICON VALLEY (1999).
46. This may simply be egotistical, but perhaps not entirely. A number of studies have
suggested that negative or critical talk tends to be viewed as more intelligent than optimistic,
positive talk. In situations where clients or principals have imperfect information on which to
evaluate a person, that bias might matter. See Jeffrey Pfeffer & Robert I. Sutton, The Smart-
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ones avoid doing this too strongly, for three reasons:
(1) Challenging someone's "illusions," especially early in a
relationship, is rarely successful and tends simply to undermine the
relationship. The threat closes lines of communication, and if strong
enough, may even lead to termination of the relationship. The lawyer
may lose a client who is looking for a teammate, not a critic.
(2) The over-optimism is probably going to be a necessary
energy source if the business is to have much chance of survival. The
risk of failure is reduced if the entrepreneurs have strong faith in their
ability to succeed, and the lawyer does not want to discourage such
faith. Indeed, some financiers may treat the presence of doggedly
unrealistic optimism as something of a litmus test for providing the
money in the first place, and the lawyer will not want to interfere with
the client's ability to send the necessary signals.
(3) Just as important, but a bit more subtle, the blind faith itself
may provide surplus capital on which to base the deal in question.
Venture capital financing often leaves surprisingly little for the
entrepreneur in terms of equity and contro1.47 The residual equity
interest is worth much more if viewed from behind rose-colored
glasses.
Without an optimistically skewed valuation by the
entrepreneur, there might not be enough to offer the financing firm to
induce them to take what they know, better than the entrepreneur, is
risky. At the very least, the deal will probably come to fruition more
smoothly if the entrepreneur has an inflated valuation of the
residual. 48
Talk Trap, HARV. Bus. REV., May-June 1999, at 135, 138.
47. There is a large amount of literature on the reasons for this, most of which sensibly
explain the structures in economic terms. See, e.g., Bernard S. Black & Ronald J. Gilson,
Venture Capital and the Structure of Capital Markets: Bank Versus Stock Markets, 47 J. FIN.
ECON. 243, 244-46 (1998). However, note of over-optimism's possible influence has been taken.
See Joseph Bankman, The Structure of Silicon Valley Start-Ups, 41 UCLA L. REv. 1737, 1764
(1994); Joseph Bankman & Ronald Gilson, Why Start-Ups?, 51 STAN. L. REv. 289, 291 n.3
(1999). Bankman and Gilson note an intriguing study showing that 1/3 of Silicon Valley
engineers place themselves in the top five percent of that same group in terms of talent (ninety
percent put themselves in the top 114). See Bankman & Gilson.
48. The economic roles of optimism and pessimism in negotiations is explored in Jennifer
Gerarda Brown, The Role of Hope in Negotiation, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1661, 1674-78 (1997). To
be clear, client over-optimism is not always value-adding, and often the lawyer will have to try
to neutralize the bias. When the overly optimistic entrepreneur is a seller rather than a buyer
(e.g., in a merger transaction involving the sale of a business), the inflated internal valuation
may be a barrier to the deal. In that case, the lawyer faces the touchy task of making the client
more "realistic." I suspect that this is an area in which many lawyers fare poorly, especially if
they use purely rational, argumentative discourse in an effort to make their points. The "ex
ante" point is the same: business lawyers, to be successful, must know how to deal with client
illusions, which ever way they cut. For a discussion of the challenges that lawyers face when
they try to challenge corporate myths, see generally Donald C. Langevoort, The Epistemology
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This poses an interesting dilemma for practitioners. Less-thanfull candor has significant benefits for the client: preserving the
inflated but useful self-confidence, and minimizing transaction costs.
The obvious cost to the client is some loss of autonomy, which may
not be preserved without at the same time placing those benefits at
risk. There is no easy way out,49 and most lawyers by intuition and
training are mal-adept at the interpersonal communication skills
needed to even try mediating between myth and reality for a client.
What is even more interesting, however, is the way in which the
lawyer's own self-interest comes into play in addressing this
dilemma. 5o Sometimes, to be sure, the lawyer wants a more realistic
client, and I do not doubt that lawyers often usefully "debias" their
clients. But not always. Indeed, at the risk of sounding a bit cynical, I
would guess that an important "family secret" skill that defines many
economically successful business lawyers is an ability to skew client
beliefs when the situation warrants, creating illusions if necessary to
meet specific needs and desires. 51 Savvy business lawyers often want
to be known for the ability to get deals done,52 and, given the wellknown barriers to agreement in complex transactions,53 deals will
of Corporate-Securities Lawyering: Beliefs, Biases and Organizational Behavior, 63 BROOK. L.
REv. 629 (1997).
49. One way the lawyer might seek compromise is to set forth discussion of the downside
risks in a way that treats them as "boilerplate" material that should not bother the client all that
much. That, however, is just another form of deception: to be fully informed and decide what to
bargain for (and how hard), the client needs information not only as to the possibility of risk,
but also the likelihood. In other words, the truly informed client needs to come to grips that the
risk of failure is a serious one for him or her.
50. On the problem of deceiving one's own clients, largely focusing on deceptions that are
truly malicious, see generally Lisa G. Lerman, Lying to Clients, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 659 (1990).
On the temptation of lawyers to overstate legal risks to clients, for any number of self-serving or
"utilitarian" reasons, see generally Langevoort & Rasmussen, supra note 36.
51. The possibility that lawyers engage in "snow jobs" with respect to their clients is
observed in John Flood, Doing Business: The Management of Uncertainty in Lawyers' Work, 25
LAW & SOC'y REv. 41, 63-66 (1991). The specific example given is the overstatement of the
particular lawyer's expertise for handling a matter.
52. This reputational interest poses a challenge because it is also in the lawyer's selfinterest to avoid blame when some event comes to pass that could have been prevented by
either more skillful drafting or not doing the deal at all. See generally Kahan & Klausner, supra
note 36; Langevoort & Rasmussen, supra note 36. In terms of this latter concern, lawyers have
good reason to be nay-sayers or "deal killers." But I suspect that sophisticated clients with
strong transactional needs sense this, and seek out lawyers with reputations as deal-promoters.
Nay-sayers as lawyers (and there are many) are ones either without the savvy to sense this in the
face of all the "negative" training lawyers receive or ones who are not repeat players in the dealmaking business.
53. A good survey of the psychological barriers is Robert H. Mnookin & Lee Ross,
Introduction, in BARRIERS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION 3,3 (Kenneth J. Arrow et al. eds., 1995).
An excellent article on ways to "harness" overconfidence and self-serving bias via the greater
use of contingent contracting is Max H. Bazerman & James J. Gillespie, Betting on the Future:
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sometimes happen only because someone works hard to sell it to the
parties. For the "deal flow" to keep moving, it sometimes takes a
kind of salesman-like puffery with one's own client. This might
involve an illusion of comfort by obscuring low-level legal risks, or
maybe priming the clients' optimistic fantasies to inject an adrenaline
shot of hunger for the deal.
The fear that lawyers do not always want a completely informed
client is not entirely speculative. Return to Silicon Valley. An
intriguing field study by legal sociologists Mark Suchman and Mia
Cahill contends that although such lawyers formally take on
entrepreneurs as clients, they in fact act almost as double agents,
compromising vigorous advocacy of client interests in the name of
getting the deal done and maintaining good relationships with
financiers for future interactions.54 Whether this is a problem worth
worrying about is not entirely clear: if the clients are aware of what is
happening before they retain the lawyers, this "mediator"
arrangement may very much be in their best interests.55 If there is less
than informed consent, then we have an interesting issue. Suchman
and Cahill claim that in acting as "proselytizers" for conventional
ways of doing business in the Valley, the lawyers "tread[] near the
boundaries of conventional legal ethics"56 by downplaying the
interests of individual clients, and hence we can at least wonder about
the consent. If they are right in their concern, then we should also
worry about how informed the clients are regarding the legal/business
risks associated with the deals they seek.
At the same time, however, the authors note the same benefit
from this sort of posture that we did: Silicon Valley lawyers are
facilitating important economic transactions at lower cost and with
less disruptive adversarial behavior than in most other settings. And
this raises the question of whether the lawyers come to construe their
own professional situation in a way that makes any sense of moral
dilemma about how informed their clients really are disappear.
These lawyers are fond of portraying themselves (aided and abetted
The Virtues of Contingent Contracts, HARV. Bus. REv., Sept.-Oct. 1999, at 155. That lawyers
can playa useful role in minimizing these barriers is emphasized in Russell Korobkin & Chris
Guthrie, Psychology, Economics, and Settlement: A New Look at the Role of the Lawyer, 76
TEX. L. REv. 77 (1997).
54. See Mark C. Suchman & Mia L. Cahill, The Hired Gun as Facilitator: Lawyers and the
Suppression of Business Disputes in Silicon Valley, 21 LAW & SOC. INQ. 679,700-01 (1996).
55. See Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents: Cooperation
and Conflict Between Lawyers in Litigation, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 509, 525-26, 564 (1994).
56. Suchman & Cahill, supra note 54, at 701.
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by legal journalists) as a new breed of more enlightened transactors,
as much business advisers as legal advisers. They happily tell of the
role they have played in the Valley's creation story. They probably
do deserve a good round of applause, but this story-the belief that
what they are doing is good, right and special-sounds suspiciously
like a myth itself. That, in turn, leads us to lawyers' own myths, and
the possibility that mythic sense-making can sometimes serve as a
cover for self-serving behavior, or at least to deflect serious
professional self-examination.

B.

Myths and Ethics

A robust area for research in social cognition has to do with
ethics and altruism: why do people so often behave either well or
poorly? Some of this research is optimistic. There are intriguing
findings on moral development (that certain forms of learning can
prompt more responsible behavior), and substantial emphasis is
placed on the surprisingly powerful role that perceptions of fairness
play in motivating behavior. Although the area is a highly contested
one, there is evidence suggesting that trust and cooperation exist to a
greater degree than can be explained by calculative "game theory"
models of repeat play.57
At the same time, however, there are also darker findings. One
line of research has to do with what might be termed hypocrisy - the
tendency to act differently from the beliefs one espouses. The
standard account of hypocrisy is that the behavior is shameful. A
person deliberately adopts a benign public posture designed to inflate
others' perceptions of him or her, while at the same time privately
acting in a selfish fashion. The cognitive account is very different. 58
Most people are motivated to see themselves (not simply have others
see them) as good, reasonable and responsible. That is generally
good news, for their behaviors will often conform to this desired self57. See, e.g., Max H. Bazerman et aI., Can Negotiators Outperform Game Theory?, in
DEBATING RATIONALITY: NONRATIONAL ASPECTS OF ORGANIZATIONAL DECISION MAKING
78, 78 (Jennifer J. Halpern & Robert N. Stem eds., 1998); Colin F. Camerer, Progress in
Behavioral Game Theory, 11 J. ECON. PERSP. 167, 169 (1997).
58. See generally C. Daniel Batson et aI., In a Very Different Voice: Unmasking Moral
Hypocrisy, 72 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1335 (1997); George Loewenstein, Behavioral
Decision Theory and Business Ethics: Skewed Trade-Offs Between Self and Others, in CODES OF
CONDUCT: BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH INTO BUSINESS ETHICS, supra note 44, at 214, 214. The
self-serving inference bias is well-documented among lawyers, too. See Theodore Eisenberg,
Differing Perceptions of Attorney Fees in Bankruptcy Cases, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 979, 979-82
(1994); George Loewenstein et aI., Self-Serving Assessments of Fairness and Pretrial Bargaining,
22 J. LEG. STUD. 135, 140-41 (1993).
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image. However, when there is enough ambiguity about what is
right-a variety of possible inferences-the mind will often
subconsciously construe the situation selfishly, creating a cover that
allows the person to maintain consistency between the desired selfimage and the taking of what would, to the external observer, be selfinterested behavior.
That form of biased sense-making has been the focus, for
instance, of experimental work on the subject of environmental
responsibility. A commonly-observed form of hypocrisy is the person
with progressive political attitudes who drives a gas-guzzling car like a
sport utility vehicle. Researchers have come up with a fairly complex
set of explanations for such behavior (some of which has to do with
time-discounting, impulsiveness, loss aversion and a host of other
biases), but a sizable part of it is creative rationalization. Max
Bazerman and his colleagues summarize their research along the
following lines:
One explanation for the relationship between self-ratings .and
assessment of the importance of the behaviors is that the selfserving bias enables subjects to believe that they are doing well
relative to others on important activities (and that the ones they are
not doing well on are not important). These biases may cause
people to believe that their positive contributions to environmental
issues are more important than the contributions of others. For
example, a person who puts a lot of effort into recycling but refuses
to take public transportation may justify this decision by taking the
position that recycling is the most important aspect of addressing
the environmental crisis. Again, the attitudelbehavior gap results,
in this case because there is ambiguity as to which behaviors are the
most important in reality.59

One can, of course, extend this kind of reasoning to many other
settings. To take the example of Silicon Valley lawyers, I suspect that
they are highly motivated to develop creation stories that stress the
special nature of the Valley in societal (not just personal) wealthcreation, the special role that lawyers have played in this
development, and a causal connection between lawyers' playing a
more intermediary than client-advocacy role and these socially
important outcomes. This myth can offer a rationalization for a
variety of personal wealth-producing behaviors (e.g., diminished
59. Max H. Bazerman et aI., Environmental Degradation: Exploring the Rift Between
Environmentally Benign Attitudes and Environmentally Destructive Behaviors, in CODES OF
CONDUCf: BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH INTO BUSINESS ETHICS, supra note 44, at 256, 264. For a
discussion of further work, see generally Max H. Bazerman et aI., The Human Mind as a Barrier
to Wiser Environmental Agreements, 42 AM. BEHA V. SCIENTIST 1277 (1999).
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advocacy in the interest of maintaining connections with venture
capitalists, taking compensation from clients in stock options)60 that
uncommitted observers would find at least worthy of discussion.
Once again, I am not saying that Silicon Valley lawyers are wrong:
indeed, I am one of those who sees them in more ways than not as a
model for good business lawyering. All I am saying is that Silicon
Valley lawyers (and those who want to be like them) have come to
believe a Silicon Valley Gilgamesh that, while grounded in empirical
observation, is probably embellished in self-serving ways.
The underlying lesson is extraordinarily important to anyone
who wishes to promote compliance with either law or ethics, and is
grossly underappreciated by legal scholars. The prevailing view tends
to say that law and ethics work very easily with highly socialized
"good" citizens: the task is simply to formulate and communicate the
appropriate expectations effectively. As to those who are not so wellsocialized, there need to be carrots and (especially) sticks.
The cognitive account complicates this in interesting ways.61 To
be sure, there are people who are habitually virtuous. There are also
people who are socialized in such a way to make them highly
obedient to authority; so long as they are not subject to mixed signals
from those in authority as to what is appropriate, they will conform to
expectations. That is their way of reducing the anxiety that comes
from assuming a greater measure of personal responsibility for one's
actions. But the great bulk of people, especially those who succeed in
highly competitive environments, will filter legal and ethical
expectations through individual or group lenses. For many, that
filtration will involve an implicit and unconscious search for ways to
maintain consistency between the desire to be good and the desire to
be successful. This form of rationalization can readily blunt the
power of "official" norms.
In an interesting line of empirical research, social psychologist
Tom Tyler has looked at compliance with a variety of legal rules: tax,
His work argues that traditional
intellectual property, etc. 62
60. Putting aside the conflict of interest questions, it should be clear that lawyers who have
an equity interest in their clients have that much more motivation to encourage the optimism
(not necessarily realism) of their clients.
61. For a suggestion that lawyers do poorly at understanding this, see Linda Klebe Trevino
et aI., Managing Ethics and Legal Compliance: What Works and What Hurts?, 41 CAL. MGMT.
REV. 131 (1999).
62. See supra text accompanying note 7. See generally TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE
OBEY THE LAW (1990); Tom Tyler, Compliance with Intellectual Property Laws: A
Psychological Perspective, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 219 (1997).
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influences like probability of detection and severity of sanctions
dominate only at relatively high numbers-far higher than society
delivers in areas such as software piracy (making unauthorized
copies) or, for that matter, most forms of misconduct short of murder.
Below that, personal choices as to compliance are affected by the
actor's evaluation of the legitimacy of the regulation. Of great
importance here is the fairness of the norm, especially in terms of the
process by which it was formulated and applied.
If that is right, the task of promoting "good" behavior by lawyers
will be problematic on a number of grounds. Much of legal ethics is
aspirational, and even the mandatory is grossly underenforced. There
is ample room for people to come to believe that the probability of
sanction from some unvirtuous course of action is small; they
probably even underestimate what sanctions might occur. In this
setting, the mind turns to testing the legitimacy of the expectation.
Consciously or not, it becomes easy for many people to denigrate or
distinguish the norm, especially when it has some ambiguity to it
either as formulated or applied to the situation in which the lawyer
finds himself. The rationalizations-which some psychologists call
"intuitive lawyering"63-are familiar ones that we have all employed:
everyone else is doing it, or would do it were they in my situation; I'm
doing it for the greater good (i.e., when I'm more successful or
powerful I'll be "better" than others); I have no power over the
situation; and so on.64 What is important here is the creative tendency
to develop illusory beliefs in which one has confidence to support the
rationalization.
One can see here, for instance, the disturbing power of
cynicism.65 Cynicism is not so much a mode of thought of the morally
bankrupt as it is a way that highly socialized individuals and groups
try to maintain self-respect in the face of the pressure to succeed. For
instance, a belief that the pronounced norms of legal ethics are the
product of already wealthy and successful lawyers who themselves
63. See Roderick M. Kramer & David M. Messick, Ethical Cognition and the Framing of
Organizational Dilemmas: Decision Makers as Intuitive Lawyers, in CODES OF CONDUCf:
BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH INTO BUSINESS ETHICS, supra note 44, at 59, 69.
64. See generally EXCUSES: MASQUERADES IN SEARCH OF GRACE (c. R. Snyder et al.
eds., 1983).
65. For the suggestion that people often are overly cynical in their evaluations of others,
see generally Chip Heath, On the Social Psychology of Agency Relationships: Lay Theories of
Motivation Overemphasize Extrinsic Incentives, 78 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION
PROCESSES 25 (1999); Justin Kruger & Thomas Gilovich, "NaiVe Cynicism" in Everyday
Theories of Responsibility Assessment: On Biased Assumptions of Bias, 76 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 743 (1999).
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would not behave in accordance with their own dictates, especially if
they were in "my" situation, can readily undermine the legitimacy of
the stated norm, and trigger a cascade of implicit excuse-making. I
suspect that many lawyers overestimate the self-serving behavior of
other lawyers simply because the resulting impression facilitates
rationalization in the face of intense competition. It is much like the
tendency of people to believe that panhandlers usually lie about their
claimed needs and tend to misuse money on alcohol or drugs. That
belief is formed without anything more than anecdotal evidence in
the way of empirical support. That such a belief is often strongly held
suggests that its function may largely be to make subjects of requests
feel better about keeping their money for themselves.
The implication of all this is fairly clear, and helps us understand
why it is frequently so hard to get people to behave in the way legal
or ethical rule-makers want. Intended audiences test expressed
norms for legitimacy, and their evaluation is predictably self-serving.
Target groups can easily develop mythic beliefs that effectively blunt
the impact of the rule without much in the way of guilt. I suspect that
this poses a severe problem in business firms. Rationally, as many
companies have discovered, there are extraordinary costs associated
with employee misbehavior in the form of fraudulent sales practices,
etc. As a result, many firms invest heavily in compliance and ethics
programs. But by all accounts, such programs are not easy to make
effective.
There is an interesting story from Xerox Corporation, which has
long had a thoughtful and well-funded ethics and compliance
program, indeed something of a model. High level managers were
sufficiently pleased with their system so they allowed a journalist an
unusual level of access to sales and marketing personnel to observe
true "customer orientation" at work. 66 Surprisingly, the reporter
instead found an internal culture that clung to military and sports
imagery, with not infrequent abuses of customer trust and substantial
bragging about the "wins" in ritualistic group celebrations that
followed a successful sales period.67 The disconnect with the
expressed norm, if true,68 is striking. What was most interesting in the
66. See John M. Darley, How Organizations Socialize Individuals into Evildoing, in CODES
OF CONDUCf: BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH INTO BUSINESS ETHICS, supra note 44, at 13, 25.
67. The resulting book is DAVID DORSEY, THE FORCE (1994).
68. Obviously, journalists have their own self-serving fonns of inference, perhaps
"discovering" a state of affairs that is useful largely because it tells a marketable story. I will
take an agnostic position about how much of the disconnect is real in the Xerox account.
However, it at least rings true with my experience in other fields with high sales and marketing
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account is the nature of the rationalization - the language and culture
carefully framed the salesman-customer interaction as a game or
battle voluntarily entered into by both sides, so that even an
"aggressive" win was legitimately earned. That was a guilt-reducing
frame. But why was the company's announced (and presumably
smart) policy of customer respect unable to reframe the norm?
The explanation is no doubt a complicated one, but two myth
perceptions are likely, both driven by the promotion and
compensation strategy common to Xerox and most other highly
competitive firms of establishing strong rewards for meeting or
exceeding gradually ascending sales quotas, and dealing harshly with
those who fall short. One is cynicism, the belief-inaccurate, I
suspect-that the company policy was just another form of
advertising and spin, not meant to be taken seriously below.
Another, consistent with Tyler's view, is that such a policy was
perceived as unfair and hence illegitimate by those who risk such
serious personal loss under the prevailing compensation and
promotion structure if they comply when others in the company do
not. To those with reason to fear falling short absent aggressive steps,
it becomes psychologically comforting to imagine that "everyone does
it." Once again, the important insight here is that such beliefs are
formed not because they are accurate (they mayor may not be), but
because, on an individual or small group level, they are useful forms
of rationalization to support the pursuit of success. There is an
important message here for lawyers: Constructing an effective
ethics/compliance program involves not only articulating goals and
procedures, but also fighting the kinds of self-serving perceptions that
threaten to undermine their legitimacy. That is more easily said than
done, and is a task for which lawyers often are intellectually illequipped.
III. POSTSCRIPT: MYTHS AND STORIES
If accuracy is nice but not necessary in sense-making, then what is

necessary? The answer is, something that preserves plausibility and
coherence, something that is reasonable and memorable, something
that embodies past experience and expectations, something that
resonates with other people, something that can be constructed
retrospectively but also can be used prospectively, something that
captures both feeling and thought, something that allows for
embellishment to fit current oddities, something that is fun to
components (e.g., stockbrokers).
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construct. In short, what is necessary in sense-making is a good
story.69

Much of the foregoing has been cautionary rather than
encouraging. Perhaps, then, we should end more hopefully by asking
if there is something in the research on the psychology of sensemaking that would constructively help teach us how to overcome the
more dysfunctional forms of myth and rationalization that put such a
hard protective coating over the pursuit of self-interest. For instance,
we have learned that anyone who wishes to make legal or ethical
norms effective must first persuade her often skeptical audience of
their legitimacy, difficult sometimes as that might be. That involves
more than articulating the norm, as if the reasons for following it are
self-evident, something I suspect is lost on many rule-makers who fall
prey to the false consensus effect and overestimate the extent to
which others share one's own beliefs, thereby underestimating the
challenge of interpersonal communication. The need to justify in
anticipation of often self-serving popular skepticism is something that
commentators on the "expressive" function of law have yet to explore
in any depth.70
This is too large a task, and I know too little, to try to offer a
thorough prescription. But one theme in the literature that is
potentially helpful is the emphasis on the role of stories in effective
sense-making and communication. I have no desire to revisit the
controversy of recent years on story-telling in (or "as") legal
scholarship. There is ample support from the social sciences,
however, for the underlying idea that stories have a greater capacity
to influence than more rational forms of discourse. That the most
important cultural myths tend to be in the form of stories is longrecognized evidence of this.
No doubt much of it has to do with the affective response that
good stories generate.71 Such stories are told in such a way that they
69. KARL E. WEICK, SENSEMAKING IN ORGANIZATIONS 60-61 (1995).
70. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV.
2021 (1996); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 903,
964 (1996). I do not want to be critical here. I agree completely with the idea that law can be
important in social norm creation, but suspect that it is easy to underestimate the difficulty in
communicating legal norms in a way that has substantial persuasive power. For a suggestion
that the law of insider trading may actually serve as an example of savvy norm entrepreneurship
because of the way the underlying story is presented to the public, see Donald C. Langevoort,
Rereading Cady, Roberts: The Ideology and Practice of Insider Trading Regulation, 99 COLUM.
L. REV. 1319, 1328-30 (1999).
71. See GARY KLEIN, SOURCES OF POWER: How PEOPLE MAKE DECISIONS 177-96
(1998). Klein's book emphasizes what much other recent research in judgment does: that there
is an emotional "feeling" component to decision-making that has been underestimated in much
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are easily remembered and shared with others. In emphasizing the
role of stories in organizational cognition, Karl Weick tells of a
nuclear power facility, Diablo Canyon in California, that like all
others has a compelling organizational need to stress safety
precautions, especially taking fairly small risks seriously.72 That sort
of thing could, and was, communicated dispassionately through
lectures, training sessions and compliance manuals. One day a
construction worker drove a Ford Mustang too fast near the facility,
hitting a parked pick-up. The pick-up caught fire, starting a forest fire
that for a time threatened to move dangerously close to the facility.
Ultimately, no further harm was done. But the story lived on
(probably embellished) in the facility's internal workplace culture, a
readily communicated symbol of how big problems can come from
small events. One suspects that the Mustang story is still worth more
than a host of lectures. 73
But how many lawyers would build a story like this into a
compliance program? By nature, of course, business lawyers in their
professional roles are lecturers and critics, not storytellers. There is a
great faith in the ability to persuade-to create a sense of legitimacy
for what others are expected to do-simply through formal
declaration and argumentation, and I suspect that this compromises
lawyers' effectiveness in generating desired behavior by others. I
would guess that a good corporate lawyer, wanting to induce
managers' compliance with norms of fiduciary responsibility, does
much more by telling a story from some recent cases of the court's
displeasure with another high level executive's bow to a comparable
temptation than any systematic analysis of elements of the cause of
action in evaluating breaches of fiduciary duty. Indeed, Ed Rock's
recent survey of Delaware corporate law cases on shift-in-control
other work. He gives a vivid description of expertise in terms of "gut feelings," (i.e., visceral
ways of sensing when something is amiss by telling the story of a firefighter who left a burning
building just before the collapse of a floor simply on gut reaction, only later being able to
articulate in more scientific terms why there was danger). See id. at 21-23.
72. See WEICK, supra note 69, at 130.
73. At Florida Power & Light, company managers once came upon a process that, in their
view, created a higher level of productivity. They were sufficiently proud that they nominated
themselves for the Demming Award, recognizes model forms of creative efficiency in American
business. One of the inspectors, a Japanese businessman, came to review the application and,
with a few deft questions, ripped apart the innovation. The good results, he concluded, were
dumb luck. His pronunciation of this finding, however, was "You were rucky." To this day, we
are told, the term "rucky" has become the code within the company culture for encouraging
greater analytical care (and avoiding self-serving inference) in evaluating data. See Chip Heath
et ai., Cognitive Repairs: How Organizational Practices Can Compensate for Individual
Shortcomings, 20 RES. ORG. BEHAV.l, 6-7 (1998).
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transactions is written to be a morality story, ideally suited for
retelling to others.74 I suspect, in fact, that the court's recitation of the
facts involves an editing designed to sharpen the sense of drama and
diminish ambiguity.
Without wanting to make any overly ambitious claim, there is an
appealing connection between law and myth in suggesting that
lawyers wishing to promote legal and ethical compliance by clients
and other audiences (e.g., other attorneys) learn to find and use
stories better than they currently do. In my work dealing with
lawyers who assist in a client's fraud, a review of the prevailing rules,
even a glimpse at social science research on complicity in wrongdoing,
has at best a moderate impact on most audiences.
Most
inexperienced audience members cannot readily imagine actually
encountering such a problem, and probably overestimate their ability
to control the situation were they to encounter it. Better results come
from having them think about Clark Clifford, the late, distinguished
Washington lawyer who toward the end of his career became
complicit, to some degree, in the BCCI banking scandaU5 If they are
not already familiar with Clifford, the audience can quickly see him as
the embodiment of what most young lawyers want to be: powerful,
admired and wealthy. They can connect with him, if by nothing but
wishful thinking. From there, it is easy to set out the facts and pose
the question of how, or why, the complicity followed. While a few
might come away with the cynical conclusion that Clifford was
basically venal and had masterfully fostered a contrary illusion over
the course of his career, most will not. They will have to struggle with
the issue, and in the process, I suspect, see the problem in some
depth, emotionally as well as intellectually. Then we can get to the
rules.
Once more, I will concede that there is nothing all that new here:
the power of well-told stories is another trite insight of modern
thought, well-incorporated in the law and literature genre of legal
thinking. What is significant and interesting, to me at least, is simply
how well it fits into our more general cognitive account of human
sense-making. By and large, the narrative structure is well-suited to
conveying the impression of the world as a more controlled,
74. See Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?,
44 UCLA L. REV. 1009, 1047 (1997); see also Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social
Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 1253, 1270 (1999).
75. See Donald C. Langevoort, Where Were the Lawyers?: A Behavioral Inquiry into
Lawyers' Responsibility for Clients' Fraud, 46 V AND. L. REV. 75, 77-78 (1993).
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predictable place. But often the stories people tell to themselves and
others are wrong, and for all their adaptiveness on average, myths can
sometimes be too comforting or distracting. The point to end on is
this: precisely because their myths are often so adaptive as anxiety
buffers, people will not let go of them easily. Those who have to fight
through other peoples' myths, as good lawyers are occasionally called
upon to do, will often have to have a more compelling story than the
one they want to displace.
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